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Abstract
Islamic banking is developing rapidly around the world and is increasingly recognized as a viable alternative mode of financing especially these
last years when capitalism has shown its limits and weaknesses. However, this astronomical growth of banking and Islamic finance was associated
with a high level of corruption that plagues many Muslim countries. This ailment of corruption can deter Islamic banking to be a better effective
and meaningful pathway for poverty reduction and economic development. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on
the soundness of Islamic banks (IBs). Using a panel of 69 IBs over the period 2008–2010, we provide robust evidence that the corruption level
aggravates the problem of impaired financing.
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1. Introduction
There are obvious contradictions between the Islamic teach-
ing and financial intermediation systems that have emerged
over the last three centuries. In particular, loans based on inter-
est are a key component of modern banking practice, while that
according to Islamic teaching, the perception of riba, additional
amount added to the loan principal, is exploitative. Riba is
forbidden (haram) by the Holy Qur’an as well as by the Sunnah
because money itself has no intrinsic value. The Islamic finan-
cial system prohibits the payment or receipt of any predeter-
mined, fixed rate of return. The Shariah (Islamic Law) forbids
making money from money. The wealth can be raised by invest-
ing in assets. The second principle of Islamic banking is the
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS).
This principle is complementary with the first one. Banks do
not charge fixed interest on the loans offered to their customers
but they are rewarded by sharing the profit. The business risks
should be shared in order to avoid imposing undue risk to either
party. This principle reinforces solidarity and fraternity between
partners, some sharing the burden of others. The third principle
is the prohibition of Islamic financial contractual uncertainties
called gharar that could lead to the exploitation of one of the
parts by the other.
The total amounts of Shariah-compliant assets with
commercial banks is about US$1.7 trillion at year-end
2013 suggesting an annual growth of more than 17% and
serving approximately 38 million customers (World Islamic
Competitiveness Report 2013–14). However, an overview on
these figures reveals a relatively underdevelopment of this
branch of finance in the majority of Muslim countries and
especially in North Africa than in countries of the Cooperation
Council Gulf (GCC) and Malaysia (see Appendix 1). The plau-
sible explanation of this evidence is that the diffusion of Islamic
banking industry depends positively on the income per capita,
share of Muslims in the population and status as oil producer
(Imam & Kpodar, 2010). This prosperity of Islamic finance
helps to fulfill the needs of Muslims to obtain a financing that
respects their religion (Halal financing), The reason of the
tremendous progress of Islamic banking lies in their rationality
and effectiveness experienced by Muslim as well as non-
Muslim countries (Ebrahim & Safadi, 1995). Unfortunately,
the high corruption levels in the majority of countries where
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Islamic banks are operating may slow their growth down and
affect their soundness.
Corruption is a serious barrier to effective mobilization
and allocation of resources. Indeed, it diverts resources at the
expense of vital activities for poverty eradication and sustain-
able economic development. It represents a great obstacle to
development and economic growth (Wilhelm, 2002). Corrup-
tion can also lower economic growth via the aggravation of the
problems with bad loans in the banking sector (Park, 2012) and
through its negative impact on the gross national saving rate by
encouraging capital flight (Swaleheen, 2008).
Corruption can be defined as a dishonest behavior of an
officeholder seeking illegitimate private gain. It includes giving
or accepting bribes or inappropriate gifts, laundering money
double dealing, diverting funds, under-the-table transactions
and so on. Corruption is forbidden (Haram) by Islamic teach-
ings and there are several narrations (Hadiths) of the Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) that prohibit it. Indeed, it was narrated by
‘Abdullah bin’ Amr that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said:
“May the Curse of Allah be upon the briber and the bribe
recipient”.1 That’s mean bribery is a big sin in Islam. Muslim
should not accept or pay a bribe (risywah)2 in any form
and under any circumstances. Thus, Muslim’s transactions
(muamalet ) should not involve any form of corruption.3 Hence,
the plausible explanation of the spreading corruption in the
majority of Muslim countries is that some individuals are not
adequately faithful and devout to the Islamic teaching. In this
sense, Jabbar (2011) states that internal constraint such as
aqidah (faith, belief) should support external constraints such
as education, law and institutional infrastructures in combating
corruption. He argues that the high levels of corruption in
Muslim countries may be explained by the weakness of external
constraints and the nearly absence of internal constraint.
However, investigating the linkage between Islam and corrup-
tion, we find that there is no significant relationship between the
Muslim percentage of total population and the corruption per-
ception index (for more details see Appendix 1). Similarly,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)
find that corruption is adversely correlated with hierarchical
religion.4
The main goal of this study is to investigate the impact of
corruption on the soundness of Islamic banks. The novelty of
this study consists in the employment of the corruption level
as a determinant of non-performing financing ratios in Islamic
banks. The analysis of this topic seems very interesting for
several reasons. First, Islamic banks operate in accordance with
the teaching of Islam which condemns corruption and considers
it as a heinous sin. The second reason is that these banks are
governed by Shariah Committee whose role is to ensure that all
bank’s transactions comply with Islamic principles. Thus, an
eventual significant linkage between corruption and impaired
financings raise the question on the effectiveness of this gover-
nance. The third reason is that credit risk exposure differs
significantly between Islamic banks and conventional banks
(Olson & Zoubi, 2008). Islam takes the matter of debt very
seriously and warns against it. The Muslim should not under-
take debt except in necessity. If the Muslim was obliged to
obtain a loan, he must honor his engagement and pay it off. In
this sense, the Messenger of Allah mentioned that if a man did
not pay back his debt, he would not enter in Paradise.5 However,
the reality differs from the “ethical” behavior defined by
Islamic beliefs and teachings. Indeed, the non-performing
financing doubled between 2008 and 2009, and has since
remained at high levels for certain countries within the GCC
(Islamic financial services industry stability report 2013). Thus,
the investigation of the determinants of impaired financings is
of great importance given that the problem of non-performing
debts largely represents the most common cause of bank failure
and losses due to the non-repayment of loans pose a serious
threat to financial stability (Beattie, Casson, Dale, McKenzie, &
Turner, 1995).
While the absence of data on bank corruption level makes it
necessary to be cautious, this study does provide an insightful
result. We find that corruption hampers Islamic banks to opti-
mally allocate their resources. Indeed, it aggravates the problem
with impaired financings and this negative impact is more
notable for high corrupt countries.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2
presents evidence and literature on the determinants of credit
risk. Section 3 presents data used in analysis and develops
hypotheses on the predicted role of each variable. The main
empirical results are reported in Section 4, while Section 5
provides some robustness tests. Section 6 summarizes the
results and concludes.
2. Literature review
Islamic banks can face a problem of impaired financing
because they provide interest-free loan (Qard hasan) and offer
credit sale products such as ‘al-bai-bithaman ajil and alijarah
thumma al bay’. The non-recovery of these receivables may
be due to the bank’s own deficiency for not being prudent in
credit valuation and debt collection (Rosly, 2005). Beck
Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013) provide evidence that
Islamic banks have lower non-performing loans compared to
conventional banks. Similarly, Baele, Farooq, and Ongena
(2014) investigate whether religion beliefs affect the loan
default rates in Pakistan. They find that the default rate on
Islamic loans is less than half the default rate on conventional
1 Sunan Ibn Majah 2313, Book 13, Hadith 6.
2 Bribe (risywah) means giving a gift to someone to achieve certain benefit.
3 See Jabbar (2011) for a comprehensive examination of corruption from the
perspective of Islam.
4 Regarding the relationship between corruption and Christianity, Treisman
(2000) shows that Protestant traditions are associated with lower perceived
corruption.
5 The Prophet said: “By the One in Whose hand is my soul, if a man were
killed in battle for the sake of Allah, then brought back to life, then killed and
brought back to life again, then killed, and he owed a debt, he would not enter
Paradise until his debt was paid off ”. Narrated by Muhammad ibn Jahsh,
in Islam: Questions and Answers – Jurisprudence and Islamic Rulings:
transactions.
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loans. Moreover, they conclude that religion considerations can
mitigate the problem of bad loans. Mokhtar and Zakaria (2009)
conduct a comparative study on the classification and manage-
ment of non-performing loans in Islamic banks in Malaysia and
conventional banks in the UK and Japan. They find that Islamic
banks are quite indulgent in their classification and manage-
ment of bad debts. Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) find that there
is no difference between the soundness of Islamic banks and
conventional banks during the financial crisis of 2008. They
conclude that Islamic banks are deviating from their theoretical
business model.
Examining the existing literature on the determinants of
default risk, we point out that Park (2012) is the first who
directly explores the linkage between corruption and the asset
quality of conventional banks. He shows that corrupt practices
undermine the banking sector to optimally allocate loanable
funds and the effects of an increase in corruption are transmit-
ted in lower country’s economic growth. The other previous
studies provide evidences that corruption may affect the sound-
ness of banks indirectly through several channels. Swaleheen
(2008) finds that corruption is adversely related to the gross
national saving rate as it distorts the incentives to save and
impairs the ability to save. He demonstrates that corruption may
negatively affects saving rate through its positive correlation
with real interest rate. Wilhelm (2011) shows that corruption
hampers bank lending in Russia and this detrimental effect is
mainly relevant for loans to households and firms in opposition
to loans to government.
Regarding the other determinants of credit risk, previous
papers provide evidence that impaired debts depend on
macro-economic and bank-specific factors (Abid, Ouertani, &
Ghorbel, 2014; Chaibi & Ftiti, 2015; Louzis, Vouldis, &
Metaxas, 2012; Makri, Tsagkonas, & Bellas, 2014; Park, 2012;
Zribi & Boujelbène, 2011).
Zribi and Boujelbène (2011) examine the determinants of
credits risk in a panel of Tunisian commercial banks over the
period 1995–2008. They provide empirical evidence that the
main determinants of credit risk in Tunisia are bank-specific
factors (ownership structure, the prudential regulation of capital
and profitability) and macroeconomic variables (rapid growth
of GDP, inflation, exchange rate, and interest rate). In a cross-
country study, Park (2012) shows that the risk of loan portfolio
is significantly related to macroeconomic factors, such as
household consumption level and governance indicators, and
bank-specific variables such as capital adequacy ratio.
Louzis et al. (2012) find that macroeconomic variables
(GDP, unemployment, interest rates, and public debt) and man-
agement quality are the major determinants of NPLs for Greek
banks.
Makri et al. (2014) examine the determinants of NPLs in the
Eurozone over the period 2000 to 2008. They find that the loan
portfolio quality depends on macroeconomic variables, such as
public debt, unemployment and GDP, and bank-specific factors
such as capital ratio and return on equity.
Abid et al. (2014) analyze the determinants of households’
non-performing loans using a panel of Tunisian banks over
the period 2003–2012. They provide evidence that households’
NPLs can be explained by macroeconomic variables (GDP,
inflation, interest rates) and by bad management quality.
Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) investigate whether the determinants
of NPLs differ between market-based economy and bank-based
economy. They conclude that except inflation rate, the set of
macroeconomic variables (GDP, unemployment, interest rate
and exchange rate) influence NPLs in both economies. By
contrast, their findings reveal that the credit risk in bank-based
economy is more susceptible to bank specific determinants.
3. Data and hypothesis development
3.1. Data and descriptive statistics
The main purpose of this paper is to identify the impact of
corruption on the soundness of IBs. The corruption indices are
collected from the Transparency International reports. Following
previous studies on NPLs in conventional banking, we assume that
non-performing financing (NPFs) levels can be explained by
both macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants. The
macroeconomic variables are taken from theWorld Bank database,
and the bank-specific ones are collected from the Bankscope
database (see Appendix 5). Our sample consists of unbalanced
panel data of 69 independent full-fledged IBs operating in 16
countries over the period 2008–2010 (see Appendixes 2 and 3).
The choice of the sample period is motivated by the important
increase of impairments during this period. Indeed, the asset
quality of Islamic banks has been adversely affected by the global
financial crisis (IFSB-IFSI stability report 2013). Appendix 6
provides descriptive statistics of variables.
3.2. Dependent variable: non-performing financings/gross
financings (NPFs)
We use the ratio of non-performing financings reported to
gross financings as the dependant variable in the analyses of the
impact of corruption on the soundness of IBs. This ratio repre-
sents an indicator that reflects the quality of bank assets. NPFs
ratios range from a low of 3.9% (for UAE) to high of 21.51%
(for Bangladesh). If we take the case of GCC6 countries for
example, the non-performing financing doubled between 2008
and 2009, and has since remained at high levels (Islamic
financial services industry stability report 2013).
3.3. Explanatory variables
a) Corruption
In this paper, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is used
to measure the country’s corruption level. This index was first
launched by the Transparency International in 1995. The CPI
includes 177 countries in 2013 against only 41 in 1995. It scores
countries on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived.
From 1995 to 2011, the CPI ranks countries on a scale from 0
(highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Transparency International
currently scores on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating high
6 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)includes 6 members namely Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
285K. Bougatef /Borsa I˙stanbul Review 15-4 (2015) 283–295
levels of corruption and 100 low levels. A poor score sends
an alarming signal to government that its citizens are not
satisfied by the measures taken to fight against bribery and
corruption.
Following Park (2012), we define the corruption index as
follows:
CI CPI= −10
This measurement indicates that high CI means a high level
of corruption. Table 1 shows the distribution of the average CI
scores for 16 countries by region where Islamic banks of our
sample are operating. It is not surprising to note that theAfrican
region is the most corrupt. The scores range from a low of 2.93
(for Qatar) to a high of 8.43 (for Sudan). The average of CI for
16 countries is 5.68, which indicates that corruption represents
a serious problem for the majority of these countries (for more
details see Appendix 4).
Examining the existing literature, we point out that the rela-
tionship between corruption and asset quality needs further
investigation since we find only two papers on this topic. Park
(2012) finds that corruption distorts the allocation of bank
funds from normal projects to bad projects and as a conse-
quence aggravates the problem with NPLs. Similarly, Boudriga,
Taktak, and Jellouli (2009) emphasize the important role of
a better corruption control in reducing NPLs in the MENA
countries.
In Islamic framework, the effects of corruption on the asset
quality of Islamic banks should be different from the ones
observed in the case of conventional banks for two reasons.
First, Islamic banks should theoretically hire and deal with
trustworthy and honest persons.7 Gambling and Karim (1986)
state that if the individuals are Muslims so their personalities
are Islamic and their culture is Islamic. Hence, Muslim’s
transactions (Muamalet) should not involve any form of
corruption. The second reason consists in the role played
by Shariah Committee in ensuring the compliance of Islamic
bank’s activities to the Islamic principles. Given the
aforementioned arguments, the soundness of Islamic banks is
expected to be less affected by corruption than the case of
conventional banks.
b) Macroeconomic factors
Numerous studies in banking literature provide evidence on
the significant link between macroeconomic environment and
the asset quality of banks (Abid et al., 2014; Chaibi & Ftiti,
2015; Louzis et al., 2012; Makri et al., 2014; Park, 2012; Zribi
& Boujelbène, 2011). There are several macroeconomic vari-
ables suggested by previous researches as determinants of
credit risk. In this study, we assume that the asset quality of IBs
may depend on the overall economic environment, households’
debt and business debt.8
Economic growth: The impact of the overall economic envi-
ronment on the non-performing financing rates is not obvious.
Indeed, in period of economic prosperity firms will tend to take
advantages of these favorable business conditions and will be
likely to undertake new projects. Thus, the demand for financ-
ing will increase and the probability that banks will fund bad
projects will also increase. By contrast, economic expansion
may be associated with lower NPLs since during the booming
period both consumers and firms earn a sufficient stream of
income and revenues to pay back their debts (Louzis et al.
2012). In a comparative study between Australian and US
economies, Ali and Daly (2010) provide evidence that GDP is
highly significant and negatively correlated with the default risk
in both countries. Similarly, Khemraj and Pasha (2009) show
that an improvement in the real economy translates into lower
bad loans. In Islamic framework, debt (dayn) is an obligation
to be fulfilled especially if the Muslim is able to repay it.
Islam takes the matter of debtedness very seriously and advises
Muslims to avoid it as much as possible.9 Given that economic
prosperity may increase the ability of borrowers to fulfill their
obligations and the fact that debt should not be undertaken only
in case of necessity, we predict a negative relationship between
economic growth and NPFs.
In this paper, we use the annual growth rate of GDP to
control overall economic environment. The highest GDP
growth rate is 17.7 for Qatar in 2008.
Household debts (HHC): Islamic banks provide essentially
retail services that satisfy, for the most part, needs of employ-
ees. They provide means of payment and grant funding to
individuals for the acquisition of vehicles and housing. These
retail banking services can be considered as a consequence
of the economic development and the emergence of a middle
class relatively wealthy. In Islam, debt is permissible only if the
borrower is determined to repay it. So theoretically the increase
of household debt should not have any significant impact on the
asset quality of banks since all borrowers engage to pay off their
debts. However, in practice the increasing demand for financing
by households reluctant to deal with conventional banks that
7 Surah Al-Qasas (28), verse 26, “One of the women said, “O my father, hire
him. Indeed, the best one you can hire is the strong and the trustworthy.”,
Translation of Saheeh International.
8 Inflation is excluded in order to avoid multicolinearity among explanatory
variables since we find that this variable is highly associated with corruption.
See Al-Marhubi (2000) for more details on the relationship between corruption
and inflation.
9 There are several narrations (Hadiths) of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH)
that warns against debt and urges Muslims to avoid it. You can refer to al Abu
Dawood (3341), Saheeh al-Nasaa’I (4367) ....
Table 1
Distribution of CI scores by regions.
Region # Of countries CI scores Avg. CI
[0,4] (4,6] (6,10]
Middle East 9 2 4 3 5.7
Asia & Pacific 4 1 3 6.98
Africa 3 1 2 7.08
Total 16 2 6 8 5.68
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use Riba transactions may affect adversely the ability of Islamic
banks to correctly evaluate the solvency of their customers,
which in turn contributes in the increase of impaired financings.
Thus, we expect that the increase of household debts deterio-
rates the asset quality of Islamic banks.
We use the growth rate of household final consumption
expenditures to proxy for the financing provided for consumers
(Qardh Hassan and credit sale products). The annual percent-
age growth of household final consumption expenditure is
based on constant local currency. This annual growth ranges
from a low of −15.298 for UAE in 2009 to a high of 57.479 for
Bahrain in 2010.
Business financing (FIXED): A rising demand for funding
by firms may encourage banks to engage in fierce competition
for market share in loans, resulting in strong credit growth rates.
The easiest way to gain market share is to lend to borrowers
of lower credit quality (Fernandez de Lis, Martinez Pagés and
Saurina, 2000). By contrast, Boudriga et al. (2009) find that
high credit growth is associated with a reduced level of problem
loans. They explain this result by the fact that banks that are
concentrated on their credit activity are more likely to evaluate
effectively the true credit quality of borrowers. Given that
Islamic banks have relatively a shorter experience to deal with
corporations, we assume that these banks face more difficulties
to correctly assess the solvency of firms. Thus, the rising of
business debts is expected to aggravate the problem with
impaired financings.
In this study, we use the gross capital formation (GCF)
divided by the GDP to proxy for funds given to firms. This ratio
ranges from a low of 11.701 for Yemen in 2010 to a high of
39.22 for Qatar in 2009.
c) Bank-specific factors
To have an exhaustive study of the determinants of NPFs,
our investigation should not be restricted to macroeconomic
factors, which are exogenous to the banking industry. Several
bank-specific factors have been suggested by previous literature
as determinants of the bank’s asset quality. In this study, the
size and the profitability of the bank and its quality of manage-
ment are expected to affect the amount of NPFs10.
Size: Under the moral hazard hypothesis, large banks tend to
take excessive risks. Stern and Feldman (2004) point out that
the government explicitly or implicitly protect big banks
because the failure of these institutions threatens to cripple the
national economy. They argue that the moral hazard created by
the “too big to fail” protection will encourage larger banks to
fund “bad” customers. Another branch of banking literature
suggests a negative relationship between the bank size and the
credit risk. Hu, Li, and Chiu (2004) argue that large-sized banks
have more resources to evaluate and to process loans. These can
improve the quality of loans and thus effectively reduce the rate
of NPLs. Fernández de Lis et al. (2000) analyze the credit risk
using a panel dataset of Spanish commercial and savings banks.
They find that the bank size is inversely related to NPLs sug-
gesting that large banks are relatively more effective in screen-
ing loan customers. In Islamic banking, Yousfi (2013) argues
that profit-loss sharing (PLS) financing cannot solve the moral
hazard problem. In this paper, the bank size measured by loga-
rithm of total assets is expected to be negatively related to the
rate of NPFs.
Profitability: Banks with high profitability are less pressured
to revenue creation and thus less constrained to engage in risky
credit offerings (Boudriga et al., 2009). Using a panel of Greek
banks, Louzis et al. (2012) find that the return on equity indi-
cator is statistically significant and negatively related to the
mortgages and consumer NPLs while it is insignificant for the
business NPLs. Similarly, Goldweski (2005) provides empirical
evidence that bank profitability in emerging market economies
mitigates the problem with bad loans. Using the dynamic
panel data methods estimated over 2003–2012 on around 16
Tunisian banks, Abid et al. (2014) find that the return on equity
affects negatively the NPLs for consumer loans. Similarly, the
bank profitability is expected to ameliorate the asset quality
of IBs.
We use the return on average equity (ROAE) to measure
bank profitability. ROAE is defined as net income reported to
the average equity. Net income is calculated as the difference
between income from investment of depositors’ fund and
income attributable to depositors. The average-equity is com-
puted as the sum of the equity value at the beginning and end of
the year, divided by two.
ROAE ranges from a low of (−127.147) to a high of 35.5
with a mean of 6.322 suggesting that IBs are on average prof-
itable but there is at least a bank which its deficit exceeds its
average equity.
Bank inefficiency (INEFF): The impact of cost efficiency on
NPFs is ambiguous. Indeed, under the skimping hypothesis,
NPFs may be associated with low costs since banks devote less
effort into loan monitoring and control. By contrast, under the
hypothesis of bad management, banks that are inefficient in
managing their operations are also poor in managing their loan
portfolio. Abid et al. (2014) prove that inefficiency is consid-
ered as a key indicator of bad loans. Their findings are consis-
tent with the bad management. Podpiera and Weill (2008)
provide empirical evidence indicating that deteriorations in cost
efficiency precede increases in NPLs. Salas and Saurina (2002)
explain the insignificance of the impact of cost efficiency on
NPLs for Spanish banks by the counteraction of the ‘bad man-
agement’ and ‘skimping’ effects. Given that loans are not the
preferable financing technique for Islamic banking, we think
that is more relevant to test the hypothesis of bad management.
Thus, we expect that the bank inefficiency aggravates the
problem of impaired financing.
INEFF is measured by the cost-to-income ratio calculated by
dividing the operating expenses by the operating income gen-
erated. This ratio ranges from a low of 16.231% to a high of
771.875% with a mean of 61.559%. This evidence suggests that
some IBs suffers from a lower efficiency that may be due to lack
of economies of scale due to their smaller size, or it may arise
10 The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was excluded in order to avoid the
endogeneity problem since NPFs affects the ratio of regulatory capital.
287K. Bougatef /Borsa I˙stanbul Review 15-4 (2015) 283–295
because their customers are pre-disposed to Islamic products
regardless of cost (Olson & Zoubi, 2008).11
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Model specification
We perform regressions of NPFs on a set of variables,
including a measure of corruption, macroeconomic factors and
bank-specific factors. We checked the correlations among the
explanatory variables using the Farrar–Glauber test and con-
clude that the hypothesis of the absence of multicollinearity can
be accepted. Only one correlation coefficient is above 0.5,
which makes us comfortable to employ them simultaneously in
the models (see Appendix 7). We use alternatively both mea-
sures of corruption. Following Park (2012), ICI is an indicator
function such as ICI =1, if CI > 6 47. , and ICI = 0, if CI < 6 47. .
The median CI score in our sample is 6.47, which is the simple
mean of 5.83 (Saudi Arabia) and 7.1 (Egypt).
To take into consideration the time persistence of NPFs,
we introduce the lagged dependent variable (NPFs) on the
right side of the equation. This procedure assumes that current
values of NPFs may be affected by previous values of those
impairments.
NPFs NPFs Xit i t it i it= + + ′ + +−α γ β ν ε, 1
where i and t subscripts indicate bank and year, respectively.
α is the constant term. Xit is the vector of explanatory
variables (corruption, macroeconomic factors and bank-
specific factors). β is the vector of coefficients. νi are the
unobservable bank characteristics, and εit is the error tem.
The addition of a lagged dependent variable renders
traditional panel data estimators (pooled-OLS, fixed effects,
and random effects) biased. Various methods have been
developed to deal with this issue. Anderson and Hsiao (1981)
derive an instrumental variables approach based on first
difference to remove individual effects. Anderson-Hsiao
estimator can be considered a special case of the GMM
procedures. Subsequent models have been proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Ahn
and Schmidt (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) to improve the
efficiency of estimators for dynamic panel data.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a first-difference equation
for unbalanced panel in order to eliminate the bank-specific
effect. Therefore, the equation may be presented as follows:
NPFs NPFs NPFs NPFs
X X
it i t i t i t
it i t it
− = −( )
+ ′ −( ) +
− − −
−
, , ,
,
1 1 2
1
γ
β ε −( )
−
εi t, 1
However, the differencing raises the problem of correlation
between the new error term ε εit i t−( )−, 1 and the lagged
dependent variable introduced in the right side of the equation.
To address this issue and to deal with possible endogeneity
problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose using the lagged
values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments.
4.2. Results
The results obtained from the regression of the non-
performing financings (NPFs) as dependent variable on a set of
explanatory variables using panel GMM estimation are
reported in Table 2. The lagged NPFs on the right-hand side is
positive and significant. Moreover, the Sargan test and the serial
correlation test prove the validity of our model and emphasize
the importance of taking into account the first lag of the depen-
dent variable.
As can be seen in the Table 2, the coefficients of corruption
are positive and statistically significant at 1% level for both
measures suggesting that corruption aggravates the problem
with impaired financing through channeling funds to bad proj-
ects instead of good ones. This result is predicted since the lack
of competition between Islamic banks may leads to corruption
in lending.12
Other results are as follows. The coefficients of economic
growth (GDP) are not significant for both models indicating the
irrelevance of the role played by the macroeconomic environ-
ment in enhancing the asset quality of IBs. This result is con-
sistent with finding in Park (2012).
The coefficients of FIXED are positively and significantly
associated with NPFs in both models suggesting that increased
lending to firms results in a more severe problem in the non-
recovering of debts. The increase of the demand for bank loans
11 In the same line, Mokhtar, Abdullah, and Al-Habshi (2006) investigate the
efficient of the overall Islamic banking industry in Malaysia over the period
1997–2003. Their findings suggest that Islamic banks are less efficient than
conventional banks.
12 In a cross-country study, Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) find that banking
competition plays a beneficial role in reducing corruption in lending.
Table 2
Determinants of NPFs: a dynamic panel approach (GMM estimator).
Dependent variable: NPFs
[2-1] [2-2]
NPFs(-1) 0.704*** (0.000) 0.68*** (0.000)
Corruption level
CI 0.817*** (0.000) –
Ici × (CI-6.47) – 7.564** (0.025)
Control variables
GDP 0.022 (0.443) −0.047 (0.149)
FIXED 0.069** (0.024) 0.06** (0.043)
HHC −0.021*** (0.015) 0.008 (0.152)
SIZE −0.027 (0. 351) −0.033 (0.217)
INEFF 0.007* (0.081) −0.006 (0.508)
ROAE −0.066*** (0.000) −0.065*** (0.000)
F-test 0.018 0.027
Sargan test(p-value) 0.432 0.524
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.723 0.836
Observations 118 118
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. Dynamic panel data analysis (GMM estimator); numbers in paren-
theses are p-values.
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increases the possibility that banks will approve loans for bad
projects (Park, 2012).
The coefficients of HHC are negative but significant only
in the first model. This inverse relationship suggests that an
increase of the proportion of financing provided to households
improve the asset quality of IBs. The plausible explanation of
this result is that IBs provide essentially retail services that
satisfy, for the most part, needs of employees whose solvency
is high.
The variable SIZE has a negative but insignificant impact on
NPFs indicating the absence of difference between large and
small Islamic banks in screening customer financing. This
result corroborates findings in Waemustafa and Sukri (2015)
for Malaysian IBs.
The bank inefficiency turns out to have a positive impact on
NPFs but only for the first model. This evidence is consistent
with the hypothesis of bad management according to which
banks that are inefficient in managing their operations are also
poor in managing their loan portfolio. Similarly, Chaibi and
Ftiti (2015) find that inefficiency aggravates the problem with
bad loans in French commercial banks.
The bank profitability as measured by the return on average
equity (ROAE) is inversely related to NPFs. This evidence
suggests that profitable banks are more effective in assessing
the solvency of their customers since they are less pressured to
revenue creation and thus less constrained to engage in risky
credit offerings. This result is consistent with findings in Chaibi
and Ftiti (2015) for commercial banks in France and Germany.
5. Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our findings, we conduct the
same analysis using respectively an alternative dependent vari-
able and an alternative corruption indicator.
5.1. Alternative dependent variables
We employ another indicator of asset quality namely the
financing loss coverage ratio (FLCR). FLCR is computed by
dividing the sum of general provision plus specific provision
plus income in suspense by gross financing. This variable is
used since we assume that reserves are a proportional function
of NPFs. An increase of the amount of doubtful financing
results in an increase of the amount accumulated of FLCs.
Thus, we predict that corruption will have a positive impact on
this new dependent variable. As can be seen in Table 3, there is
no significant change in the main findings. Corruption turns out
to have a significant positive sign in both models.
5.2. Alternative corruption indicator
For an alternative indicator of corruption, we use the bribery
index (BI) of the Global Competitiveness Index by the World
Economic Forum. The sub-sample is restricted to 64 since
Islamic banks of Sudan and Yemen are excluded because data
about irregular payments and bribes are not available in the
WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2010–11. As shown in
Table 4, the coefficients of BI are positive and significant for
both indicators of bank asset quality.
6. Concluding remarks
Our paper explores whether corruption affects the soundness
of IBs. We find important evidence that corruption significantly
aggravates the problem with non-performing financings and
hence deteriorates the soundness of IBs. The relationship
between CI and NPFs turns out to be positive and very signifi-
cant. This result is robust to an alternative corruption indicator
and an alternative dependent variable. This evidence should be
a useful message to Shariah Boards to improve their supervi-
sory role to ensure that IBs are not deviating from their ethical
guideline.
Table 3
Robustness test (1): alternative dependent variable.
Dependent variable: FLCR
[3-1] [3-2]
FLCR(-1) 1.158***(0.000) 1.169***(0.000)
Corruption level
CI 0.275***(0.001) –
Ici × (CI-6.47) – 1.555***(0.000)
Control variables
GDP 0.069***(0.000) 0.019(0.368)
FIXED 0.038**(0.013) 0.049**(0.037)
HHC −0.016**(0.016) −0.007(0.247)
SIZE 0.002(0.941) 0.001(0.981)
INEFF 0.011** (0.016) 0.015**(0.012)
ROAE −0.196***(0.000) −0.194***(0.00)
F-test 0.048 0.047
Sargan test(p-value) 0.523 0.658
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.717 0.876
Observations 118 118
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. Dynamic panel data analysis (GMM estimator); numbers in paren-
theses are p-values.
Table 4
Robustness test (2): alternative corruption index.
Dependent variable: NPFs FLCR
Dependent variable (t−1) 0.676***(0.000) 1.058***(0.000)
Corruption level
BI 1.659***(0.000) 0.569***(0.004)
Control variables
GDP −0.079*(0.059) −0.001(0.967)
FIXED 0.214***(0.000) 0.097***(0.004)
HHC 0.005(0.574) 0.054***(0.000)
SIZE −0.018(0.561) −0.007(0.252)
INEFF 0.002 (0.624) −0.003(0.496)
ROAE −0.092***(0.000) −0.16***(0.000)
F-test 0.018 0.021
Sargan test(p-value) 0.546 0.558
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.739 0.814
Observations 110 110
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. Dynamic panel data analysis (GMM estimator); numbers in paren-
theses are p-values.
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Beyond this important result, we find that other determinants
of NPFs have the predicted signs. Taken together, our findings
indicate that there is no significant difference between the deter-
minants of NPFs in Islamic banks and the determinants of
NPLs in conventional banks.
Overall, our findings have several policy implications given
the increasing role of IBs in stimulating economic develop-
ment. Thus, the positive relationship between CI and NPFs
sends a warning signal to policymakers and government offi-
cials of Muslim countries to fight corruption actively in order
to continue their development process. In addition, the negative
link between ROAE and NPFs suggests that the improvement
of bank profitability is an important condition to enhance the
soundness of IBs. Finally, the positive relationship between
FIXED and NPFs suggests that managers of IBs should further
improve their credit risk management to correctly assess the
solvency of corporations and do not rely only on their personal
experiences and simple credit analysis (Masood, Suwaidi, &
Thapa, 2012).
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature.
First, our study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to shed
direct light on the relationship between corruption and the asset
quality of IBs. The analysis of this linkage seems very interest-
ing since IBs operate according to Shariah-rules which prohibit
corrupt practices. Indeed, the Sharia’s Supervisory Boards of
Islamic financial institutions are responsible for the fighting
and the prevention from any kind of financial crimes such as
corruption and money laundering. In this sense, our findings
raise the question on the effectiveness of the Shariah’s
governance.
This study also contributes to the existing literature on
default risk by extending the investigation of the determinants
of impairments to Islamic banking industry. Previous studies on
this topic are almost reserved to conventional banks. Thus, this
study seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
The absence of previous studies in this field made our paper
have an explorative character. Therefore, it represents a starting
point to conduct future researches which should focus on bank
corruption level instead of national corruption.
Appendix 1
Corruption in Muslim countries.
Country[1] Muslim percentage (%)
of total population
Corruption
index (CI)
Afghanistan 99.8 1.4
Albania 82.1 3.3
Algeria 98.2 2.9
Azerbaijan 98.4 2.4
Bahrain 81.2 4.9
Bangladesh 90.4 2.4
Brunei 51.9 5.5
Burkina Faso 58.9 3.1
Chad 55.7 1.7
Comoros 98.3 2.1
Djibouti 97.0 3.2
Egypt 94.7 3.1
Gambia 95.3 3.2
Guinea 84.2 2.0
Indonesia 88.1 2.8
Iran 99.7 2.2
Iraq 98.9 1.5
Jordan 98.8 4.7
Kazakhstan 56.4 2.9
Kosovo 91.7 2.8
Kuwait 86.4 4.5
Kyrgyzstan 88.8 2.0
Lebanon 59.7 2.5
Libya 96.6 2.2
Maldives 98.4 2.3
Mali 92.4 2.7
Mauritania 99.2 2.3
Mayotte 98.8 n.a
Morocco 99.9 3.4
Niger 98.3 2.6
Oman 87.7 5.3
Pakistan 96.4 2.3
Palestinian territories 97.5 n.a
Qatar 77.5 7.7
Saudi Arabia 97.1 4.7
Senegal 95.9 2.9
Sierra Leone 71.5 2.4
Somalia 98.6 1.1
Sudan 71.4 1.6
Syria 92.8 2.5
Tajikistan 99.0 2.1
Tunisia 99.8 4.3
Turkey 98.6 4.4
Turkmenistan 93.3 1.6
United Arab Emirates 76.0 6.3
Uzbekistan 96.5 1.6
Western Sahara 99.6 n.a
Yemen 99.0 2.2
[1] Source: The Future of the Global Muslim Population (Pew Research Center)
and Corruption perception index 2010 (Transparency International).
Relationship between corruption and Islam
Dependent variable: CI
Muslim 0.023 (0.176)
Constant 4.984 (0.003)
R-squared 0.051
F value 2.285*
# Obs. 45
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Appendix 2
Sample selection.
Country Total number of
Islamic banks
Number of selected
Islamic banks
United Arab Emirates 10 8
Bangladesh 3 3
Bahrain 23 6
Brunei Darussalam 3 0
Egypt 3 2
Great Britain 6 0
Gambia 1 0
Indonesia 1 1
Iraq 4 0
Iran 16 2
Jordan 3 2
Kuwait 9 5
Lebanon 3 0
Mauritania 1 0
Malaysia 17 17
Pakistan 9 6
Palestine 1 0
Qatar 5 4
Russian Federation 1 0
Saudi Arabia 4 3
Sudan 12 2
Singapore 1 0
Syria 2 0
Tunisia 1 1
Turkey 5 4
Yemen 4 3
Total 148 69
Appendix 3
Composition of the sample.
United Arab Emirates Dubai Islamic Bank plc
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank – Public Joint Stock Co.
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC
Al Hilal Bank PJSC
Noor Islamic Bank
Dubai Bank
Sharjah Islamic Bank
Tamweel PJSC
Bangladesh Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd
First Security Islami Bank Ltd
ICB Islamic Bank Limited
Bahrain Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C.
Kuwait Finance House
Shamil Bank of Bahrain B.S.C.
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC
Khaleeji Commercial Bank
Gulf Finance House BSC
Egypt Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE
Indonesia Bank Syariah Mandiri
Iran Bank Saderat Iran
Bank Sarmaye
Jordan Jordan Islamic Bank
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank
Kuwait Kuwait Finance House
Boubyan Bank KSC
Kuwait International Bank
A’Ayan Leasing & Investment Company
Rasameel Structured Finance Company K.S.C
(continued on next page)
291K. Bougatef /Borsa I˙stanbul Review 15-4 (2015) 283–295
Appendix 3 (continued)
Malaysia Maybank Islamic Berhad
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
Public Islamic Bank Berhad
AmIslamic Bank Berhad
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad
EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad
Asian Finance Bank Berhad
Pakistan Meezan Bank Limited
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited
BankIslami Pakistan Limited
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC (EC) – Pakistan Branches
Burj Bank Limited
Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.)
Qatar International Islamic Bank
First Finance Company (Q.S.C.)
Saudi Arabia Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank
Islamic Development Bank
Bank AlBilad
Sudan Al Salam Bank
United Capital Bank
Tunisia Albaraka Bank Tunisia
Turkey Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S.-Kuwait Turkish Participation
Bank Inc
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim
Bankasi AS
Yemen Tadhamon International Islamic Bank
Saba Islamic Bank
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain
Appendix 4
NPFs and CI for the 16 countries.
No Low corrupt group High corrupt group
Country NPFs CI Region Country NPFs CI Region
1 Bahrain 6.28 4.87 1 Bangladesh 1.37 7.7 2
2 Jordan 8.3 5.07 1 Egypt 5.18 7.1 3
3 Qatar 6.12 2.93 1 Indonesia 5.7 7.27 2
4 Malaysia 6.09 5.33 2 Iran 4.6 7.9 1
5 Saudi Arabia 4.06 5.83 1 Kuwait 5.7 7.59 1
6 Tunisia 6.11 5.7 3 Pakistan 12.38 7.6 2
7 Turkey 5.23 5.5 1 Sudan 10.46 8.43 3
8 United Arab Emirates 3.9 3.8 1 Yemen 12.56 7.8 1
Median 6.47
Region 1 is Middle East, region 2 isAsia & Pacific and region 3 isAfrica. The median CI score in our sample is 6.47, which is the simple mean of 5.83 (SaudiArabia)
and 7.1 (Egypt).
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Appendix 5
Variables and data sources.
Variable Source Meaning Measurement method
Dependent variables
NPFs Bankscope non-performing financing The ratio of non-performing financing
over gross financing
FLCR Bankscope Financing loss coverage ratio as
impaired financing reserves to cover
financing losses.
FLCR (General provision + specific
Provision + income in suspense)/Gross
financing
Explanatory variables
Corruption Index (CI) Transparency International &
Author’s Calculations
The perceived levels of public-sector
corruption in a country
CI = 10 − CPI
Bribery Index (BI) Global Competitiveness Report
2010–11& Author’s Calculations
Irregular payments and bribes index BI = 10 − bribery scores
Macroeconomic variables (external factors)
Econmic growth (GDP) World Bank Growth rate of gross domestic product
as indicator of economic development
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP
at market prices based on constant local
currency
Business financing (fixed) World Bank Gross capital formation to proxy for the
loans given to firms
Gross capital formation computed as a
percentage of GDP
Household debts (HHC) World Bank Growth rate of household final
consumption expenditures to proxy for
the credits outstanding to consumers
Annual percentage growth of household
final consumption expenditure is based
on constant local currency.
Banks characteristics (internals factors)
SIZE Bankscope The size of a bank The size is defined as the logarithm of
total assets
Profitability (ROAE) Bankscope Return on average equity ROAE is defined as net income reported
to the average equity. The
average-equity is computed as the sum
of the equity value at the beginning and
end of the year, divided by two.
Inefficiency (INEFF) Bankscope bank inefficiency INEFF is measured by the
cost-to-income ratio calculated by
dividing the operating expenses by the
operating income generated
Appendix 6
Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables.
# Obs. Mean Max Min Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
NPFs (%) 188 6.85 83.197 0.010 11.543
FLCR (%) 195 5.053 81.323 0.047 8.382
Explanatory variables
Corruption
CI 48 5.68 8.5 2.3 1.48
Ici × (CI-6.47) 48 0.325 2.03 0 0.574
BI 48 2.354 4.75 0.98 1.059
Banks characteristics (internals factors)
SIZE (%) 204 33.333 64.442 11.439 7.335
ROAE (%) 200 6.322 35.5 −127.147 17.808
INEFF (%) 198 61.559 771.875 16.231 64.844
Macroeconomic variables (external factors)
GDP (%) 48 3.607 17.663 −7.076 4.783
FIXED (%) 48 23.393 39.220 11.701 6.097
HHC (%) 48 10.645 57.479 −15.298 13.741
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Appendix 7
Correlation coefficients between main explanatory variables.
CI GDP FIXED HHC SIZE INEFF ROAE
CI 1
GDP −0.128 1
FIXED −0.403 0.546 1
HHC 0.105 0.479 0.169 1
SIZE 0.045 0.105 0.003 −0.138 1
INEFF 0.119 −0.160 −0.156 −0.009 −0.079 1
ROAE 0.007 0.285 0.161 0.036 0.150 −0.443 1
Appendix 8. Glossary of Arabic vocabulary
Alijarah thumma al bay’ (Ijara w iqtina) is a type of lease
contract in which the lessee pay the lessor for use of an asset. At
the end of the rental period, the legal title of the leased asset will
be passed to the lessee.
Bay’ Mu’ajal can be defined as a contract of sale with
deferred payment. The price of the product is agreed upon
between the buyer and the seller at the time of the transaction
and cannot include any charges for deferring payment.
fard kifayah refers to the obligation which fulfillment is not
required for every Muslim. If this obligation is fulfilled by a
sufficient number of Muslims, it falls for the rest.
Musharaka is a partnership agreement between two or more
parties in the capital of a company, project or operation. The
profits are distributed according to an allocation formula. In
the case of a loss, it is supported by the parties in proportion to
the capital invested.
Moudharaba (profit-sharing) is a contract between two
parties. A named party “donors” or “Rab Al Mal” provides the
second part, called “Manager” or “Moudhareb” funds. The
latter is responsible to manage, while defining a prior allocation
of profits to be made.
Murabaha is a contract of sale at cost plus a margin
(markup) known and agreed between the bank and the
customer. The bank buys the asset chosen by the client and
resells it at the buying price plus a profit at a rate agreed
between the two parties at the time of entering into the
contract.
Istisna’a is defined as a contract of sale between the “final
buyer” or “Al Mustasni’” and “seller” or “Al Sani’”. The latter
undertakes to manufacture or acquire an asset subject of the
contract, requires a process of manufacture. The seller is
committed to buy raw materials, and provide the necessary
work to deliver the goods manufactured in accordance with
predefined description of the characteristics of the property. The
sale price and payment terms are agreed and set at the contract
signing. Payment can be done at the conclusion of the contract,
in installments or on a specified date in the future.
Qard Hassan (good loan/benevolent loan) is the unique
type of loan approved by the Shariah since it is interest-free.
Although Islamic financial institutions cannot take advantage
from loan, they may levy a commission to cover administrative
costs. This funding is only available for current customers and
is often used to ensure that those who are experiencing financial
difficulties can continue to fulfill their outstanding financial
commitments. Indeed, helping a man in financial difficulty is
fard kifayah (collective obligation) for Muslims.
Shariah is a divine Islamic law that covers all aspects of
human life as revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Sunnah the practices and saying of the Prophet Muhammad
(PBUH) during his life. The Sunnah includes the Hadith (nar-
rations) and the Prophet’s narrative decisions.
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